The daily meetings have an urgent agenda. Government graft investigators are scrutinizing the finances of Suharto’s inner circle. His friends and family may be stripped of the billions of dollars they are said to have amassed during his 32 years in power. His cherished youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, is due in court early this week to face possible prosecution for allegedly bilking the government out of $13 million. The old man has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing; his son, better known as Tommy, has done likewise. If convicted, though, Tommy could be sent to jail for 20 years. And the insiders’ problems may become even more desperate after parliamentary elections in June. Assuming that the vote is clean, there’s a real chance the big winners will be past victims of the old man’s repressive regime. Up to now the investigation has been sponsored by the government of B. J. Habibie, who bears no grudge against Suharto as his longtime acolyte and handpicked successor.
How far would the dethroned “Father of Development” go to protect his friends and offspring? The question worries a lot of people. “Suharto has been in control so long that Indonesians simply assume he and the children are behind just about everything,” says Jusuf Wanandi, head of Jakarta’s private Center for Strategic and International Studies. Rightly or wrongly, Suharto is widely blamed for recent outbreaks of unrest. When he was forced out of office he warned that the country would spin out of control. “He tells everyone, ‘You got rid of me. Now here’s the chaos’,” a Western diplomat observes. “That leads many people to believe he’s somehow behind much of today’s violence. And he may well be.”
Whether or not the upheaval has Suharto’s blessing, he stands to benefit from it. Outsiders can’t be sure what schemes he might be hatching. But most observers think his basic strategy is a simple one: anything to stop reform. The method served him well during his 32 years as president. He devoted his regime’s resources to disrupting and silencing the democratic opposition. Now that he’s out of office, his family’s wealth and liberty may depend on preserving the national status quo. “He knows he’s too smelly and unpopular to return to power,” says another Western diplomat. “But he certainly wants to prevent his enemies from assuming power democratically.”
Thousands of followers, both military and civilian, share Suharto’s hope and fears. They hardly need direct orders from him to stir up trouble. Last week a powerful bomb ripped through the basement offices of Jakarta’s Istiqlal Grand Mosque, the country’s largest house of worship. Religious leaders joined the president in begging Indonesians to remain calm and, in Habibie’s words, “not to fall into the trap of those who want to thwart the general election.” The opposition Islamic leader Abdurrahman Wahid agreed that the blast was designed to sabotage the vote. “It was done by floating groups comprising former armed forces members,” he declared–that is, by demobilized military men not controlled by the current armed forces commander, the relatively straitlaced General Wiranto.
Rogue Army elements have also been busy in East Timor. Last year Habibie announced an autonomy plan for the tiny former Portuguese colony, which has battled for freedom ever since being forcibly annexed by Jakarta in 1976. Soon after Habibie’s announcement, military operatives in East Timor began illegally organizing and arming pro-Indonesian militias. In the last three weeks the militias have run wild. They attacked independence supporters at a Roman Catholic mass, killing several worshipers. Two weeks ago more than 1,000 vigilantes in three dozen trucks roared through the provincial government’s capital, Dili, slaughtering as many as 25 civilians, while police and soldiers stood and watched. Some Army men even handed out water and cigarettes to the marauders.
Under heavy international pressure, Wiranto finally intervened last week. He flew to Dili and brokered a pause in the shooting. The vague and hastily arranged pact wasn’t even a formal cease-fire. The militias have stopped killing civilians–for the time being–but local Army officers gave no public promises to keep the peace. Meanwhile civilian mobs have been carrying out religious and ethnic vendettas in several major islands, including Java.
Nevertheless, many Indonesians expect the June vote will be held as scheduled. “Violence will take place,” predicts Wahid, himself a prominent candidate for Parliament. “But it won’t be enough to sabotage or nullify the election.” Suharto is said to be funding several of the 48 political parties in the race. The point would be both to make new political friends and to splinter the Parliament so badly that no opposition leader is capable of forming a strong government. Some observers think the effort may be useless. “Suharto’s power is eroding fast,” says Wimar Witoelar, a popular television commentator in Jakarta. “He has even lost the ability to protect what he loves most, his children.”
Don’t count the old man out. His political and financial resources may be shrinking, but he still has more clout and cash than most of his antagonists. Some Indonesians, even among the educated classes, believe Suharto also has supernatural powers. Nunung Harmono, 26, is a journalism major. She had a frightening experience at an anti-Suharto rally near his house late last year. “There was a force pushing against us, stopping us from moving forward,” she says. “It was invisible and strong. I felt it was from Suharto, and I was afraid.” A little superstition can be a big help in Indonesia.
